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DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA:
THE LENDER'S GAUNTLET REVISITED*
HARRIS OMINSKYt
I. INTRODUCTION
T WO recent Pennsylvania appellate court decisions' have fo-
cused lenders' counsel's attention on Pennsylvania's depres-
sion-inspired Deficiency Judgment Act (the Act). 2 The Act is
designed to protect a defaulting borrower from a lender who
takes over the mortgaged property at foreclosure and thereafter
seeks to pursue the borrower personally on the original debt.
3
Before the Act, at a time when property values were de-
pressed, a lender might foreclose and find, to his dismay, that
there were no third-party bidders at the sheriff's sale. The sheriff
* Excerpts from Mr. Ominsky's article have been reprinted in the
Pen nsvlvania Law Journal-Reporter with the permission of the Villanova Law Review.
f Harris Ominsky is a partner in the Philadelphia law firm of Blank, Rome,
Comisky & McCauley. He is a graduate of the Wharton School of the University
of Pennsylvania (B.S. in Economics 1953) and the University of Pennsylvania
Law School (1956), where he was elected to the Order of the Coif and was an
editor of the Law Review.
He is the Editor of the Newsletter of the Real Estate Section of the Philadel-
phia Bar Association, a member of the Board of the Pennsylvania Bar Institute
(which is the educational arm of the Pennsylvania Bar Association), Chairman of
its Long Range Planning Committee; and is a frequent course planner and lec-
turer for the Institute on real estate and mortgage topics.
He has been a Lecturer at Law at Temple Law School and is a member of
the American College of Real Estate Lawyers.
1. First Pennsylvania Bank v Lancaster County Tax Claim Bureau, 504 Pa.
179, 470 A.2d 938 (1983); Valley Trust Co. v. Lapitsky, - Pa. Super. -, 488
A.2d 608 (1985). For a discussion of the ways in which these two cases may
affect the lender's procedural requirements under the Deficiency Judgment Act,
see infra notes 37-43 & 58 and accompanying text.
2. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103 (Purdon 1982). A copy of Penn-
sylvania's Deficiency Judgment Act is reprinted in the Appendix to these articles.
3. See Philip Green & Son, Inc. v. Kimwyd, Inc., 410 Pa. 202, 205, 189 A.2d
231, 232 (1963) (Act was passed during Depression to militate against injustice
of executing creditor being able to purchase debtor's real estate at nominal cost
at execution sale while still being able to hold debtor to full amount of debt).
Numerous articles have been written about the struggle of legislatures and
courts to protect borrowers from lenders who take over mortgaged property and
then seek to pursue borrowers personally for the full amount of the underlying
debt. See generalv 2 G. LADNER, CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA § 12.28 (4th ed.
1979); Nelson, Deficiencv Judgments After Real Estate Foreclosure in Vissouri: Some
,Modest Proposals, 47 Mo. L. REV. 151 (1982); Skilton, Government and the lortgage
Debtor 1940-46, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (1946); Washburn, The Judicial and Legisla-
tive Response to Price Inadequacv in .lortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REVx'. 843
(1980); Comment, Economic Aspects of the Deficiencv Judgient, 20 VA. L. REV. 719
(1934); Comment, 1Morigage DeficiencY Judgments During an Economic Depression, 20
VA. L. REV. 771 (1934).
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would then deed the property to the lender, in exchange for the
sheriff's costs and the expenses of conducting the sale. Since he
received no money toward payment of the debt, the lender would
take the position that the borrower had not repaid the loan. The
lender could conceivably assert this position even if he sold the
property after the sheriff's sale for more than the amount of the
original debt.4 The lender would then proceed personally against
the borrower and whatever personal property he owned or would
own.
While deficiency judgment procedures are applicable to com-
plex commercial mortgage loans as well as residential loans, the
main battles are usually fought in the commercial arena. As a
practical matter there are few residential mortgages secured by
more than one property; and usually it is not fruitful for a lender
to pursue a homeowner for a deficiency judgment after that
owner has lost his home in foreclosure. Therefore, the primary
focus of this article will be on the commercial mortgage loan
transaction.
The Act attempts to prevent unjust enrichment by requiring
the lender to give the borrower credit for the fair market value of
the property deeded to the lender at the sheriff's sale.5 If the fair
market value of the property equals the amount of the loan out-
standing, the debt is satisfied." Essentially, the Act is a codifica-
tion of the old adage that "you can't have your cake and eat it
too." However, as this article will discuss, sometimes lenders can
have it both ways.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE ACT
A. The Lender's Procedural Gauntlet
The Act places the procedural burdens of establishing the
value of the mortgaged property squarely on the lender. The
lender must petition the court to fix a fair market value of the
4. At first blush, it seems that the borrower should get credit for the
purchase price. However, it is not that simple. The sale may not be consum-
mated until after other collateral has been taken over and resold. Should these
other transactions then be invalidated? Furthermore, the purchase price may
not be an accurate measure of the net benefits to the lender. The lender may
have devoted thousands of dollars of time to complete the sale, and may have
given substantial concessions to the purchaser. For example, the sale price
should be discounted by the value of favorable purchase money financing given
to a purchaser. In addition, the purchase money loan may never be collected.
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property deeded to him at the sheriffs sale. 7 If the lender fails to
petition the court within six months of the sale, the debt is
marked satisfied upon petition of the borrower or his guarantors
to the court." Once this occurs, the lender can take no further
enforcement action against the borrower, any collateral of the
borrower, or the borrower's guarantors. 9
An onerous side effect of this petition procedure is that until
the court fixes a fair value for the property, the lender cannot
proceed against other collateral of the borrower. Unless the
lender obtains the so-called deficiency judgment, he will not be
able to enforce his rights against condemnation proceeds,n)
pledged securities, I or even a pledged savings account.' 2 There-
fore, even where the fair market value of the property is deter-
mined to be far smaller than the amount of the debt, the lender
will be stymied until the statutory requirements are met. The
price for this measure of debtor protection is that the lender's
opportunity to sell other collateral at the right price may be lost.
During the period of delay, the collateral may depreciate in value
or be dissipated. In addition, guarantors of the debt may become
insolvent or flee to Venezuela.
Pennsylvania's statutory scheme requires the lender to pro-
ceed through a series of time-consuming and expensive steps.
First, if the lender has foreclosed by action in mortgage foreclo-
sure (rather than by confession ofjudgment on the note or by an
7. Id. § 8 103(a).
8. Id. § 8103(d).
9. Id. It should be noted that guarantors of a mortgage debt are not univer-
sally entitled to the protection of deficiency judgment acts. See Annot., 49
A.L.R. 3d 554 (1973) (discussing the effect of various types of deficiency judg-
ment acts on guarantors and sureties, some of which have been held not to af-
ford protection to guarantors). This presents the anomaly of a defaulting debtor
who is insulated from further liability, while his accomodating guarantor is still
liable. It also raises questions about what subrogation rights are available to the
guarantor, who pays the balance of the debt, when he attempts to proceed
against the original debtor.
10. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Guy Heavener, Inc., 16 Pa. Commw.
386, 328 A.2d 590 (1974) (execution creditor who obtained property at foreclo-
sure sale, but not deficiency judgment, was not entitled to payment of deficiency
out of condemnation proceeds).
1I. Auerbach v. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 148 F.2d 709 (3d Cir.
1945) (under Pennsylvania law, execution creditor who obtains mortgaged prop-
erty at foreclosure sale must proceed under Deficiency Judgment Act before he
can proceed against pledged securities).
12. Kokosh v. Progressive Home Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 119 Pitt. L.J. 89
(Allegheny Co. 1971) (foreclosing creditor who was not entitled to deficiency
judgment because of failure to comply with requirements of Act could not seek
payment of deficiency from pledged savings account).
1132 [Vol. 30: p. 1129
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action in assumpsit), the lender must obtain a separate personal
judgment against the borrower for the underlying debt.' 3 This
judicially created requirement is a glaring anomaly for two rea-
sons. The lender may not be interested in, or entitled to, a per-
sonal judgment against the borrower, but rather may only want to
proceed against other collateral of the borrower. Moreover, de-
fenses raised in the action to obtain personal judgment may
render it impossible to meet the six-month deadline for filing a
petition under the Deficiency Judgment Act.
14
13. McDowell Nat'l Bank v. Stupka, 310 Pa. Super. 143, 149-50, 456 A.2d
540, 543-44 (1983) (lender who forecloses on real estate but does not obtain
personal judgment against borrower may not proceed against additional collat-
eral of borrower); National Council ofJunior Order of United Am. Mechanics v.
Zytnick, 221 Pa. Super. 391, 394, 293 A.2d 112, 114 (1972) (mortgagees who
foreclose on mortgaged property can recover a deficiency only if they obtain
personal judgment against mortgagor and then proceed under Act). In fashion-
ing the requirement of a personal judgment, Pennsylvania courts sought to en-
sure that the Deficiency Judgment Act did not extend lenders' rights under in
rei judgments, such as the judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action. See
Mecco Realty Co. v. Burns, 414 Pa. 495, 200 A.2d 869 (1964) (Deficiency Judg-
ment Act cannot be used to change nature of judgment in foreclosures from
judgment de tenis to one in personam). However, in requiring lenders to obtain
personal judgment, the courts have overcompensated for the perceived evil.
While it may be reasonable to require a personal judgment if the lender intends
to pursue the borrower personally, it does not seem appropriate in the case
where the lender wishes only to pursue other items specified by the parties as
collateral. Yet courts have required a personal judgment in order to obtain a
deficiency judgment and proceed against other collateral even if the collateral is
covered by the same mortgage as the collateral foreclosed upon. Other recent
decisions have wisely rejected this requirement. See, e.g., Concord-Liberty Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Mooney, 33 Pa. D. & C.3d 107, 109 (1984) ("Furthermore, resort
to a deficiency judgment proceeding having as its object the fixing of personal
liability upon the foreclosure defendants is useless and void.").
If the requirement of a personal judgment is applied to loans with exculpa-
tory provisions, the results will be bizarre. A blanket mortgage may limit the
borrower's liability to the described properties. If a lender, after foreclosure on
one parcel, must obtain a personal judgment before proceeding against the
others, it will be unexpectedly barred from proceeding against the other proper-
ties under the mortgage regardless of the value of the first property.
14. If the borrower raises a defense to an assumpsit action, litigation and
appeals could delay final judgment for years. Formerly, quick personal judg-
ments could be obtained by requiring borrowers to agree to confession ofjudg-
nent clauses in the notes. However, a gradual erosion of l'ennsvlvania's
confession ofjudgment procedures has rendered confession ofjudgment a less
viable alternative. See 42 PA. CoNs. STAr. ANN. § 2951(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984-
1985) (requiring person seeking confession ofjudgment to file complaint in or-
der to obtain confession ofjudgment if amount due cannot be ascertained from
looking only at instrument); North Penn Consumer Discount Center v. Schultz,
250 Pa. Super. 530, 378 A.2d 1275 (1977) (in context of confession ofjudgment
on note, due process requires that debtor have opportunity to be heard before
execution ofjudgment against his property). Thus, the requirement of a per-
sonal judgment places the lender in a "Catch-22" of sorts: ie cannot obtain a
deficiency judgment without first obtaining a personal judgment, but he cannot
confess judgment or otherwise obtain a personal judgment without filing a corn-
1985] 1133
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A second step in the process of fulfilling the statutory re-
quirements involves the lender's retaining an appraiser.' 5 The
appraiser must gain access to the building in question and render
an appraisal of the property, after the customary research into
comparable sales and other factors. 16 This information will be
crucial to the lender's success because he bears the burden of es-
tablishing the fair market value of the property in a deficiency
judgment proceeding.17
Third, the lender must prepare and file with the court a peti-
tion to fix the fair market value of the property based upon the
appraisal.' 8 Appropriate service of the petition must be given to
all owners of the property as well as to all guarantors or other
persons directly or indirectly liable for the debt.' 9 Failure to
name such parties and serve them properly results in discharge of
the parties from any personal liability.
20
If the borrower files an answer to the petition challenging the
lender's evaluation, the court must schedule a hearing and make
the determination of value. 2' As some appraisers will admit, an
appraisal is only an educated guess of value. 22 It is no guarantee
plaint and providing opportunity for a hearing. Procedural delays in obtaining
the personal judgment could push the lender well past the six months after fore-
closure deadline for filing the petition for deficiency judgment.
15. Pennsylvania courts have held that the Act does not require a profes-
sional appraisal. See, e.g., National Council of Junior Order of United Am.
Mechanics v. Zytnick, 221 Pa. Super. 391, 392-93 n.l, 293 A.2d 112, 114 n.l
(1972). However, most lenders find that professional appraisal is the most prac-
tical method of establishing the fair market value of the mortgaged property.
For a discussion of the lender's burden in establishing the value of the property,
see infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the factors which go into establishing the fair market
value of the property, see itzfra note 22.
17. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(c) (Purdon 1982) (indirectly requir-
ing lender's petition to allege fair market value for the property).
18. Id. § 8103(a).
19. Id. § 8103(b). Failure to notify all interested persons does not preclude
proceeding against any respondent who has been named and properly served.
Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. § 8103(c)(4). The Act gives the borrower the opportunity to re-
spond to the lender's petition in a number of ways. In addition to the option of
filing an answer and producing testimony to contest the lender's valuation, the
borrower may convince the lender to accept the borrower's valuation and stipu-
late to that effect. Id. § 8103(c)(3). The borrower can simply not respond to the
petition, or he can contest the petition but provide no testimony supporting a
valuation other than the lender's. In either case, the court must fix the value of
the property at the value alleged in the lender's petition. Id. § 8103(c)(1) & (2).
22. The Act requires a court to fix the "fair market value" of the property.
Id. § 8103(a). Courts have held that fair market value is "the price which the
property would bring at a fair sale between parties dealing on equal terms."
1134 [Vol. 30: p. 1129
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that the property will sell for the appraised value on the market.
The borrower gets credit, under the Act, for the amount of the
educated guess. 23 However, the lender cannot spend the guess.
If the lender is later unable to sell the property at its appraised
value, there is no way he can reduce the litigated credit.
Appeals from the ruling on fair market value are, of course,
available to any party.24 However, this right to appeal cuts both
ways for the lender. A vindictive, determined borrower could,
through the appeal procedure, further delay the lender's collec-
tion efforts for many more months.
The foregoing discussion outlines some of the inherent risks
and procedural obstacles the lender faces when he takes over
mortgaged property at the foreclosure sale and then attempts to
proceed against other collateral of the borrower or against guar-
antors of the debt. Once the lender succeeds in establishing that
the fair market value of the mortgaged property is less than the
amount of the debt, he may then proceed against the borrower's
other collateral for the difference.2 5 If the lender subsequently
forecloses on another parcel of real estate, he must go through
the entire foreclosure proceeding again. And if the second prop-
erty is deeded to the lender at the foreclosure sale, the lender
must again walk the same procedural route he walked after taking
over the first property. A Pennsylvania mortgage lender holding
a mortgage on several properties at different locations within the
state must pass through an unenviable procedural gauntlet before
he can take title to all his collateral.2 6 And it is important to rec-
Union Nat'l Bank v. Crump, 349 Pa. 339, 343, 37 A.2d 733, 735 (1944). In
determining this price, courts might consider the following factors:
(1) recent sales of realty of comparable location and descriptions;
(2) the uses to which the subject property is adapted and might rea-
sonably be adapted;
(3) the demand for the subject property and the demand for similarly
situated realty;
(4) income produced by the property;
(5) all other elements that may affect the realty's actual value.
Id. (citations omitted).
23. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(c) (Purdon 1982) (discharging debtor
to extent of fair market value of realty obtained by lender, as fixed by court).
24. The appellate court may review the trial court's determination of fair
market value of mortgaged property in a deficiency judgment proceeding to as-
certain whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding and whether
the trial court committed a reversible error of law. Walnut St. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Bernstein, 394 Pa. 353, 147 A.2d 359 (1959); Cheltenham Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Pocono Sky Enters., 305 Pa. Super. 471, 451 A.2d 744 (1982);
Shrawder v. Quiggle, 256 Pa. Super. 303, 389 A.2d 1135 (1978).
25. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(c) (Purdon 1982).
26. Id. § 8103(a) (providing for applicability of Act "[w]henever any real
1985] 1135
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ognize that taking title is only the first step a lender takes toward
realizing cash to discharge the debt.
B. Manipulating the Gauntlet
Rules concerning junior and senior mortgages suggest strat-
egies that could be employed by a sophisticated lender who holds
more than one mortgage on a property and who wishes to avoid
the procedural delays imposed by the Act. Where a lender holds
both a senior and a junior mortgage on a property, the Act ap-
plies only to the mortgage which is foreclosed.2 7 After a foreclo-
sure on the first mortgage followed by a sheriff's deed to the
lender, the lender can still proceed against the borrower for the
unaffected debt covered by the second mortgage. 28 The follow-
ing example illustrates a possible strategy for lenders holding first
and second mortgages that are in default.
Suppose that a lender holds a first mortgage of $100,000 and
a second mortgage of $50,000, for a total of $150,000 of debt, on
a property with a fair market value of $100,000. Further suppose
that the lender would like to take over the property at the sheriff's
sale if there are no third-party bidders, and that he would then
like to pursue the borrower for the excess of the underlying debt
over the fair market value of the property. The question is what
steps the lender should take in order to minimize procedural hur-
dles imposed by the Act.
Under the Act, it makes a difference whether the lender
elects to foreclose on the first or the second mortgage. If the
lender forecloses on the first mortgage of $100,000 and a third
party purchases the property for $100,000 at the sheriff's sale, the
lender will receive the $100,000 in satisfaction of the first debt
and will be able to proceed against the borrower for the $50,000
debt without the impairment imposed by the Act.2' If there is no
property is sold") (emphasis added). See also Union Trust Co. v. Tutino, 353 Pa.
145, 149, 44 A.2d 556, 558 (1945) (if mortgage covers more than one parcel of
land and execution is against only one parcel, mortgagee must comply with Deft-
ciency Judgment Act before he can proceed against other property of debtor,
including other parcels covered by mortgage).
27. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Thorne, 52 Pa. D. & C. 688, 689 (Alle-
gheny 1943) (Act applies only to debt on which judgment was entered and does
not limit proceedings on another debt secured by second mortgage).
28. Cf National Bank of Chester Valley v. Thomson, 51 Lanc. Rev. 169,
170, 4 Chest. 38, 39 (1948) (where holder of first lien purchases property sold at
execution sale on second lien that is held by another creditor, debt secured by
first lien is not affected by Act).
29. This is true because the Act applies only to proceedings on the debt
secured by the mortgage which was foreclosed. See supra notes 27-28 and accom-
[Vol. 30: p. 11291136
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bidding at the sale, the property will be deeded to the lender and
the $100,000 debt will be deemed satisfied, since the fair market
value of the property is $100,000. As in the first scenario, the
lender will be able to pursue the borrower on the $50,000 debt
without going through the Deficiency Judgment Act's
procedures.3
0
If, on the other hand, the lender chooses to foreclose on the
second mortgage, the property will be transferred at a sheriff's
sale subject to the first mortgage of $100,000.' Assuming that
there are no bidders who are willing to bid more than the fair
market value at the sale, the property will be deeded to the
lender. Since the Act only applies to the mortgage which is fore-
closed, the lender will be able to proceed against the borrower for
the $100,000 debt without going through a deficiency proceed-
ing. In addition, the lender could proceed under the Act on the
$50,000 debt. He could argue that, since the property with a
market value of $100,000 was transferred subject to a $100,000
mortgage, the borrower should not get any credit toward the
$50,000 obligation.
In summary, by electing to foreclose on the second mort-
gage, the lender probably is left with the property and a total of
$150,000 in claims against the borrower. If, on the other hand,
the lender chooses to foreclose on the first mortgage, he will be
left with the property and only a $50,000 claim. 3 2 A puzzle aficio-
panying text. In order to simplify the mathematics in these examples, the author
is ignoring interest on the debt to which thc lender might be entitled, and he is
assuming that there are no offsets against the price received or the fair market
value of the property, such as costs, taxes, or municipal claims.
30. This is true, again, because the Act applies only to proceedings on the
debt secured by the mortgage which was foreclosed. See supra notes 28-29 and
accompanying text.
31. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8152 (Purdon 1982) (a prior mortgage is
not divested by a foreclosure sale to satisfy a junior mortgage).
32. There are alternative results to the one presented in the text. A some-
what sophisticated analysis demonstrates one of these alternatives. Consider the
case where the lender purchases the property at the sheriffs sale for a nominal
sum, subject to the first mortgage of $100,000. After the lender collects on the
$100,000 debt from other assets of the borrower, the borrower could try to re-
quire the lender to assign the $100,000 mortgage to him. In effect, the bor-
rower would be subrogated to the lender's rights in the mortgage against
property owned by the lender upon payment of the underlying debt. See G. Os-
BORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw § 7.15 (1979). A
factor militating against the borrower's subrogation is the distinction made by
courts between paying off a mortgage and purchasing it. Courts have curbed the
right of a party to require an assignment of a mortgage which that party has
paid. See Burgoon v. Lavezzo, 92 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1937) and cases cited
therein.
The borrower might also argue that the first mortgage is extinguished
1985] 1137
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nado or computer mathematician could substitute different hypo-
thetical factual situations and come up with infinite variations on
this theme. It is sufficient to say that because of the peculiarities
of the Act the lender should carefully work out his strategies
before he commences foreclosure proceedings in order to maxi-
mize his return and minimize procedural obstacles.
C. Recent Battles Over the Gauntlet
As indicated by the case citations to the Introduction, the ap-
plicability of the Act to foreclosures of mortgages secured be sev-
eral properties, sometimes called "blanket mortgages," has been
hotly contested recently. If the properties are located in one
county and sold at one sale, the Act should present no particular
problem for the lender, even if the properties are separately auc-
tioned. 33 However, if the properties are in different counties3 4 or
are sold at different times, 35 Pennsylvania courts have held that
the Act applies. Consequently, a lender who takes over a prop-
under the doctrine of merger. See id. §§ 6.13-. 14. See also McDonald v. Magirl,
97 Iowa 677, 679-80, 66 N.W. 904, 905 (1896) (where holder of both first and
second mortgage forecloses on second mortgage and purchases property at
foreclosure sale, senior mortgage is merged into fee interest and debt secured
by senior mortgage is extinguished). However, this latter argument is likely to
fail because the lender did not intend to merge the mortgage interest with his
fee interest in the property. See Continental Title & Trust Co. v. Devlin, 209 Pa.
380, 384-85, 58 A. 843, 844 (1904) (intent of parties controls whether encum-
brance will merge in estate of purchaser at foreclosure sale of subsequent lien).
33. See Farmer Trust Co. v. Murray, 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 41, 44 (Snyder, Union
1975) (Act not applicable where creditor levied on several properties located in
same county at same execution sale). Accord Hoffman Lumber Co. v. Mitchell,
170 Pa. Super. 326, 85 A.2d 664 (1952) (creditor violated Act when, after levy
and sale on three tracts of land, he attempted to recover against other assets of
debtor without first fixing value of property sold).
34. Properties located in different counties necessarily are sold at different
sheriff's sales because the sheriff in a given county can only execute against
properties in his county. See First Pennsylvania Bank v. Lancaster County Tax
Claim Bureau, 504 Pa. 179, 189-90 n.7, 470 A.2d 938, 944 n.7 (1983). For a
discussion of the effect of property being sold at different times, see infra note
35. For a discussion of the First Pennsylvania Bank court's analysis of this result,
see infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
35. Valley Trust Co. v. Lapitsky, 339 Pa. Super. 177, 182, 488 A.2d 608,
612 (1985) (where mortgage covered more than one parcel in the same county,
but execution was issued against only one tract, lender was required to proceed
under Act before executing against other mortgaged properties); Union Trust
Co. v. Tutino, 353 Pa. 145, 149, 44 A.2d 556, 558 (1946)(same); Western Flour
Co. v. Alosi, 216 Pa. Super. 341, 345, 264 A.2d 413, 415 (1970) (same); First
Nat'l Consumer Discount Co. v. Fetherman, 41 Bucks Co. Rep. 138, 141 (1983)
(same). But see Kitzmiller v. Cumberland Valley Say. & Loan Ass'n, 10 Pa. D. &
C.3d 462, 471 (Cumberland 1979) (Act was not applicable in case where credi-
tor sought to sell several parcels out of twenty-nine parcels covered by blanket
mortgage).
1138 [Vol. 30: p. 1129
9
Ominsky: The Lender's Gauntlet Revisited
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
erty at a foreclosure sale would find himself barred from other
properties under the mortgage unless he obtained a deficiency
judgment.
Where the lender structures a loan by taking separate mort-
gages and notes for each parcel, he fares better under the Act. In
such a situation, the lender would be permitted to take over each
property upon foreclosure without obtaining a deficiency judg-
ment.3 6 Hence, it is advantageous to the lender to avoid blanket
mortgages on properties located in different counties or proper-
ties which are likely to be sold at different times.
Two recent appellate court decisions in Pennsylvania advo-
cate completely divergent approaches to the application of the
Act to blanket mortgages. The supreme court case of First Penn-
sylvania Bank v. Lancaster County Tax Claim Bureau,3 7 appears to
change the above results in cases of blanket mortgages. This case
is known primarily for its holding that the notice provisions of the
Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax Sale statute are inadequate under
the principles of due process. 38 However, in a decision not sup-
ported by the majority of the court, the Pennsylvania Supreme
36. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(c) (Purdon 1982) (providing that
only debt secured by the property made subject to foreclosure can be discharged
under the Act). Foreclosure of one mortgage results only in discharge of the
debt underlying that mortgage. Other debts, even if they are secured by the
same property, would not be discharged under the Act simply because the
lender foreclosed on a mortgage securing one of the debts. Peoples-Pittsburgh
Trust Co. v. Thorne, 52 Pa. D. & C. 688, 689 (Allegheny 1943). Thus, if a
lender had separate debts and mortgages for each property, he could foreclose
on one mortgage, obtain a sheriffs deed and proceed under the Act to obtain a
deficiency judgment for the underlying debt (or entirely ignore the Act) without
affecting the borrower's obligations on any other debts.
An advantage of a blanket mortgage over separate mortgages is that with
the blanket mortgage the lender has the additional security of a property's ap-
preciation in value beyond the amount of the separate mortgage which could
have been allocated to that property. For example, assume that $150,000 is
owed and that three properties are to be covered by a blanket mortgage. If the
lender makes three separate mortgages of $50,000 each, it has impaired its se-
curity. If on sale one property brings $50,000, the second $25,000 and the third
$100,000, the lender will recover the full $150,000 with a blanket mortgage.
However, it will recover only $125,000 of the $150,000 debt with separate mort-
gages. This is because the lender will only recover the $50,000 mortgage
amount on the $100,000 sale. This result can be overcome by placing three
$50,000 mortgages on each of the three properties and inserting default provi-
sions in each of them.
37. 504 Pa. 179, 470 A.2d 938 (1983).
38. Id. at 181, 470 A.2d at 939. The First Pennsylvania Bank court held that
Pennsylvania's notice provisions for tax sales were unconstitutional in that they
did not require either personal service or notice by mail to be given to a record
mortgagee in the event of a tax sale. Id. For a thorough discussion of this aspect
of First Pennsylvania Bank, see Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Pennsvlvania
Procedure Governing Notice of Judicial Sales of Real Property after Mennonite Board,
1985] 1139
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Court made sweeping pronouncements as to the applicability of
the Deficiency Judgment Act to mortgages on properties located
in different counties.39
In First Pennsylvania Bank, the lender had extended a loan and
had taken back separate mortgages on properties located in sev-
eral counties. Although the mortgages were security for a single
loan, the court indicated that the lender could take over the sepa-
rate properties at different sheriffs' sales without application of
the Act. The court observed that a lender who had to obtain a
deficiency judgment in connection with foreclosures of each par-
cel would perceive that the value of the collateral was significantly
reduced. The court then stated that it believed that "a creditor
who has bargained for a specific lien on several parcels should,
instead, be able to issue successive executions against those spe-
cific parcels until he collects his debt.''40
First Pennsylvania Bank dealt with separate mortgages securing
a single loan, so it is not clear whether the decision would have
been different if there had been a blanket mortgage. However,
the court's reasoning seems equally applicable to blanket mort-
First Pennsylvania Bank, and In Re Upset Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Berks
County, 30 VILL. L. REv. 1191(1985).
39. 504 Pa. at 186-89, 470 A.2d at 942-44. In First Pennsylvania Batik, a jun-
ior mortgagee challenged the adequacy of the notice it received of an impending
tax sale which extinguished its junior lien. Id. at 181, 470 A.2d at 939. In addi-
tion to arguing that the sale was valid, the opposing party in the case claimed
that the mortgagee was prohibited under the Act from proceeding against the
property which had been the subject of the tax sale. Id. at 186-87, 470 A.2d at
942. The mortgagee's opponent argued that the Act applied to any proceeding
against that property because the mortgagee had previously foreclosed on
properties in other counties securing the same debt. Id. at 187, 470 A.2d at 942.
The First Pennsylvania Bank court stated that its determination of the Defi-
ciency Judgment Act issue was necessary to the final resolution of the case be-
cause the mortgagee sought to set aside the tax sale, reinstate its mortgage
interest, and then foreclose on the property in question. Id. at 181-82 n.l, 470
A.2d at 939 n. 1. If the court had found that the Act had been triggered by the
mortgagee's prior foreclosure actions, the mortgagee would have been required
to proceed under the Act in order to reach the tax sale property. Id. at 188-90,
470 A.2d at 943. In this case, the mortgagee would have been unable to proceed
under the Act because more than six months had passed since the original fore-
closure proceedings. Id. at 181-82 n.l, 470 A.2d at 939 n.l. Thus, two justices
reasoned that a determination as to applicability of the Act was necessary to the
final resolution of the case.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Zappala, joined by three other justices,
stated that he agreed with the majority's holding as to the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's tax sale notice provisions. Id. at 191, 470 A.2d at 944 (Zappala,
J., concurring). However, Justice Zappala believed that the constitutional issue
disposed of the case, and that the holding as to the Deficiency Judgment Act was
unnecessary to the case and better regarded as dictum. Id.
40. Id. at 190, 470 A.2d at 944.
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gages. The effect of requiring a deficiency judgment before a
lender can proceed on parcels under a blanket mortgage in a dif-
ferent county is to diminish the value of the collateral in the eyes
of the lender. If subsequent decisions adopt the rationale set
forth in First Pennsylvania Bank, it will no longer be necessary for
lenders to avoid blanket mortgages in order to avoid applicability
of the Act.
However, the likelihood of courts following the First Penn-
sylvania Bank decision concerning the Deficiency Judgment Act
has recently been called into question. In Valley Trust Company v.
Lapitsky, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the Act was
applicable to foreclosure proceedings on various properties se-
cured by a single mortgage. 41 The lender in Valley Trust Company
held a blanket mortgage covering three properties in three differ-
ent counties. The lender foreclosed on one of the properties, ob-
tained it at a foreclosure sale, and did not file a petition for fair
value within the required six months. When the lender attempted
to foreclose on a second property covered by the mortgage, the
court refused to permit the foreclosure sale, holding that the
lender's failure to proceed under the Act after the first foreclo-
sure created "an irrebuttable presumption that the creditor was
paid in full in kind" at the first sale.42 The Valley Trust Company
court justified its departure from First Pennsylvania Bank on the
ground that a majority of the court did not join in the Deficiency
Judgment Act holding in that case, and in fact only one justice
joined in the lead opinion. 43 Until these conflicting decisions are
41. 339 Pa. Super. 177, 182, 488 A.2d 608, 611-12 (1985).
42. Id. at 182-83, 488 A.2d at 611.
43. Justice SamuelJ. Roberts has commented upon decisions in which there
is no majority opinion:
Vote-counting is important not only when the Court divides evenly
as to the appropriate judgment, but also when a majority agrees on the
judgment but disagrees as to the reasons for that result. Whenever
members of the Court either concur in the result or file a concurring
opinion, the reader is alerted to count the justices who join in each
opinion. If a justice concurs only in the result, he joins only in the
Court's judgment. If ajustice writes a concurring opinion, that opinion
must be read to see whether the writerjoins only in thejudgment of the
Court (for the reasons he expresses) or whether the writer also joins
another opinion written in the case.
Occasionally, more members of the Court will join in a concurring
opinion than in the lead opinion. An illustration is presented by the
1971 decision in Commonwealth v. English, where the concurring opinion
in fact expressed the view of four justices, thereby constituting a major-
ity opinion of precedential weight. Ironically, just last term in Common-
wealth v. Sleighter, the lead opinion advocated the overruling of English,
but a majority of the Court (four members) joined in a concurring opin-
1985] 1141
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resolved by a Supreme Court ruling in which a majority of the
court agrees, lenders must assume that the Act does apply to
blanket mortgages.
D. Avoiding the Gauntlet: Foreclosing on a Business
The Act can also cause unexpected problems if a loan is se-
cured by both a mortgage on real estate and a security agreement
on personal property. This is the traditional method of securing
a loan made to a going business. A typical loan to a restaurant,
for example, is secured by a mortgage covering the borrower's
real estate, fixtures, equipment and personal property. The mort-
gage is backed by security interests in personal property, as pro-
vided in article nine of the Uniform Commercial Code. 44 Upon
default, the lender wants to take possession of the entire business
and resell it as quickly as possible. The Act may not always per-
mit this result.
1. The Industrial Plant Doctrine
There is a way in which personal property not specifically
covered by the mortgage can be considered part of the real estate
and therefore be transferred at the foreclosure sale. In Penn-
sylvania, under the "industrial plant doctrine," fixtures and
equipment necessary to the operation of a business may be con-
sidered part of the mortgaged property and will be transferred at
the foreclosure sale as if they were real estate. 45 This is some-
times true even if the property traditionally would be considered
ion which found reexamination of the holding in English unnecessary to
the decision of the case, thus leaving it undisturbed. Although cases
where a single concurring opinion expresses a majority view are rare,
cases where no opinion commands a majority are common and should
never be mistaken as precedential.
Roberts, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: Constitutional Government in Action, 54
TEMP. L.Q. 403, 408-409 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
44. U.C.C. § 9-102 (1972) (codified in Pennsylvania at 13 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9102 (Purdon 1984)) (providing that article nine applies to all transac-
tions intended to create security interest in personal property or fixtures). In
order to be perfected, a security interest generally must be evidenced by filing of
financing statements with the secretary of state of the commonwealth in which
the collateral is located. U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-401 (1972) (codified in Penn-
sylvania at 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9302, 9401 (Purdon 1984)). Perfected
security interests enjoy priority over unperfected interests and certain other lien
creditors' interests. U.C.C. § 9-301 (1972) (codified in Pennsylvania at 13 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9301 (Purdon 1984)).
45. Singer v. Redevelopment Auth., 437 Pa. 55, 59-60, 261 A.2d 594, 596-
97 (1970) (if machinery is vital to operation of plant and is permanent part of
plant, it is considered part of real estate); Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Harkins,
312 Pa. 402, 406-07, 167 A. 278, 280 (1933) (chattel necessary to operation of
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personal property and even if it is not specifically described in the
mortgage or in the article nine financing statements. 46 In order
to come within the industrial plant doctrine, the property in ques-
tion must be an integral part of the business carried on at the
mortgaged premises and it must be placed on the premises for
permanent use.4 7 A classic Pennsylvania case involved pitcars
designed to fit the tracks of a coal mine. The pitcars were held to
be part of the mortgaged real estate under the industrial plant
doctrine. 48 Despite its name, the industrial plant doctrine is not
limited to manufacturing concerns, and has been extended even
to apartment buildings.
4 9
In a case involving fixtures, which are traditionally covered
by real estate mortgages, or property considered to be part of the
real estate under the industrial plant doctrine, the lender can
foreclose on the land and building and receive this additional
property without the Act coming into play. Inevitably, though,
there will be uncertainties about whether certain items are to be
considered real estate under the industrial plant doctrine. The
doctrine clearly has not been extended to all personal property
used in connection with a functioning business. 50 If the mortgage
does not specifically cover particular items and if they are not
deemed to be part of the real estate, either as fixtures or under
the industrial plant doctrine, the foreclosure sale will not include
business and placed in the establishment for permanent use is considered part
of real estate even if it is not attached thereon).
46. Kaczmarek v. Mesta Mach. Co., 324 F. Supp. 298 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (doc-
trine applied to property not specifically mentioned in mortgage); Common-
wealth Trust Co. v. Harkins, 312 Pa. 402, 407, 167 A. 278, 280 (1933) (doctrine
applied to chattel not attached to real estate); Fidelity Deposit & Discount Bank
v. Barrett Publishing Co., 74 Lack. Jur. 127 (1973) (doctrine applied to property
not specifically mentioned in mortgage).
47. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Harkins, 312 Pa. 402, 407, 167 A. 278, 280
(1933) (application of industrial plant doctrine depends, in great part, on
whether property in question was placed on mortgaged property permanently or
for temporary purpose); First Nat'l Bank v. Reichneder, 371 Pa. 463, 470-71, 91
A.2d 277, 280 (1952) (trucks, safes, desks, chairs, typewriters and other office
furniture were not essential to operation of plant and therefore were not cov-
ered by industrial plant doctrine).
48. See Titus v. Poland Coal Co., 275 Pa. 431, 119 A. 540 (1923).
49. See, e.g., Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Stout, 339 Pa. 302, 308, 14
A.2d 282, 284-85 (1940) (elevators in apartment building considered to be part
of realty under industrial plant doctrine).
50. See Rotell v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp., 53 Pa. D. & C.2d 46 (Mer-
cer 1971) (equipment in tavern, except for bar, backbar, cooler, walls, and car-
bonation system, could be removed without destroying "economic unit" of
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such property. Therefore, the lender may have to obtain a defi-
ciency judgment against the debtor and take other legal action to
obtain the property not covered by the mortgage in order to be
able to sell the business as a whole.
2. Intent of the Parties
Although there is no Pennsylvania case on point, a New York
case illustrates the difficulties a lender may face in attempting to
sell both the real estate and the personal property purportedly
covered by a single mortgage, at one foreclosure sale. In Statewide
Savings & Loan Association v. Canoe Hill, Inc.,51 the lender fore-
closed on a mortgage covering a golf course, a restaurant, and
"all fixtures and articles of personal property, now or hereafter
attached to or used in connection with the premises, all of which
are covered by this mortgage." 52 The lender's complaint in fore-
closure requested that it be declared the owner of the real prop-
erty and of personal property covered by the mortgage and by
separate security agreements. The complaint, however, did not
list or describe the personal property purportedly covered by the
mortgage. At a foreclosure sale, the real property and the per-
sonal property covered by the security agreements was sold and
the lender did not move for a deficiency judgment. In refusing to
grant the lender any rights in the personal property it claimed was
covered by the mortgage, the New York Supreme Court, Appel-
late Division, ruled that the lender's entitlement to the property
depended on the language in the mortgage agreement. 53 Since
the mortgage didn't specify the items of personal property it pur-
ported to cover, the court held that the lower court could not ef-
fectively adjudge the mortgagee to be the owner. In reaching its
decision, the court relied heavily on the lender's decision to take
separate security agreements on some personal property and con-
cluded that this action negated an intent to include personal
property under the mortgage lien.
Lenders can take two precautionary steps which will help to
avoid the situation described in Statewide Savings & Loan. First, in
some states, lenders who are taking a mortgage on both real and
personal property should list the specific items of personal prop-
erty securing the debt in the mortgage instrument and in any
51. 54 A.D.2d 1018, 388 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1976), affd, 44 N.Y.2d 843, 378
N.E.2d 118, 406 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1978).
52. 54 A.D.2d at 1018, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
53. Id. at 1019-20, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 190.
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foreclosure complaint. Second, lenders might reconsider taking
separate security agreements on personal property. Statewide Sav-
ings & Loan militates, albeit in a minor way, against the conven-
tional wisdom of using both a mortgage and a security agreement
when making a loan on mixed collateral. Assuming the lender's
goal is to avoid the Deficiency Judgment Act and have only one
sale of the entire business, the lender's attorney may be prejudic-
ing his or her clients by taking too much paper.
3. The Pennsylvania Dilemma
However, this will not solve the lender's problem in Penn-
sylvania because in Pennsylvania generally the sheriff will adver-
tise and sell the described real estate, but the sheriff will not
include personal property. There is no established procedure for
a lender to force a simultaneous foreclosure sale of real estate
and personal property, even if the personal property is clearly
listed in the mortgage. Therefore, suppose, upon default of a
loan to a restaurant, the lender wants to take possession of the
business as a whole-the real estate and all the equipment, appli-
ances, furniture, cooking and serving utensils. What would be the
best method of accomplishing the goal? If the lender forecloses
on the real estate, the real estate sale will not include items of
personal property that are not covered by the industrial plant
doctrine. Yet this property may be vital to successful operation of
the business as a going concern. Assuming the lender purchases
the real estate at the foreclosure sale, he will not be able to pro-
ceed against the personal property until he obtains a deficiency
judgment. 54 Under the Act, the debt will be discharged and no
judgment will be available unless the lender can persuade the
court to set a fair market value for the purchased real estate at less
than the amount of the outstanding debt.
55
54. For a discussion of procedure required before a lender can proceed
under the Act, see supra notes 7-26 and accompanying text.
55. For an example of a case in which the lender was denied the opportu-
nity to proceed against collateral, see McDowell Nat'l Bank v. Stupka, 310 Pa.
Super. 143, 456 A.2d 540 (1983). In Stupka, the court, in a somewhat Draconian
scenario, held that the lender could not proceed against the debtor's construc-
tion equipment, which had been given as collateral for the loan, because the
lender had not obtained a deficiency judgment against the debtor. Id. at 149,
456 A.2d at 543. The court required a personal judgment against the debtor,
rather than an in rei judgment resulting from foreclosure on the real estate col-
lateral. Id. at 149-50, 456 A.2d 543-44. Since the lender did not have a personal
judgment, he was prohibited from proceeding under the Act to have a deficiency
judgment entered against the debtor. Id. at 149, 456 A.2d at 543-44. Instead,
the debt was discharged. Id. at 152, 456 A.2d at 545.
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Even if the lender succeeds, the deficiency judgment proce-
dure can take months, or even years, and the lender is in a vulner-
able position during that time. He cannot sell a fully equipped
business until he completes the second phase of the procedure,
i.e., obtaining the personal property following a deficiency judg-
ment. If a borrower is aware of this, he may exact concessions
from the lender to which he would not otherwise acquiesce. In
addition, during this period of delay, other creditors of the bor-
rower may precipitate an untimely or unprofitable sale of the dis-
puted property in a way that would be prejudicial to the lender.
There is a way to avoid applicability of the Act under those
circumstances. The Uniform Commercial Code permits a lender
to sell personal property in which he has a security interest with-
out applicability of the Act.56 Section 9-501 of the Code, which is
applicable in Pennsylvania, permits a secured party to sell per-
sonal property securing a debt at a public sale and also to buy the
property at that sale. 57 Thus, the lender could proceed under ar-
ticle nine and purchase the personal property himself at the pub-
lic sale. Of course, he would have to be careful to bid high
enough to be able to acquire the property, but not higher than it
is "worth." The problem facing the lender is that he will not
know how high to bid against competing bidders, because the
value to the lender depends to a large extent on whether he will
ultimately acquire the real estate. If the lender plans to later take
possession of the real estate through foreclosure proceedings and
then sell the restaurant as a turn-key operation, then the property
is valuable to him. On the other hand, counters, furniture, ovens,
and pots and pans, without the restaurant, are of little value. But
at the time he must bid on the personal property, the lender can-
not know whether he will later be the successful bidder in the
foreclosure sale of the real estate.
A saving grace is that generally it is not difficult for the lender
to acquire these types of items at a reasonable price at the public
sale. Once he owns the personal property, the lender can fore-
close on the real estate, take possession, and sell the entire busi-
ness, fully equipped, without going through a deficiency
judgment proceeding.
Many attorneys, representing borrowers and lenders alike,
are not aware of the applicability of the Act in mixed collateral
56. U.C.C. § 9-501(d) (1972) (codified in Pennsylvania at 13 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9501(d) (Purdon 1984)).
57. Id.
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cases. Undoubtedly, many lenders have improperly foreclosed on
going businesses without the borrower raising a deficiency judg-
ment defense to the sale of his personal property. However, a
lender should not rely on the borrower's ignorance, especially
when there is an alternative strategy available. As a general rule,
the lender first should proceed against personal property covered
by article nine security agreements and then proceed to foreclose
on real estate in order to avoid the gauntlet of the Act.
The lender would not face these problems at all if the ration-
ale of First Pennsylvania Bank, as suggested above, were extended
to mortgages covering mixed collateral as well as blanket mort-
gages. The reasoning in First Pennsylvania Bank seems as applica-
ble to loans secured by mixed collateral as it is to blanket
mortgages. In either case, the lender has "bargained for a spe-
cific lien" on each item of collateral and, therefore, he should be
able to proceed against all the collateral at a single execution
sale. 58 However, the superior court's decision in Valley Trust Com-
pany makes it unlikely that the Pennsylvania courts will follow First
Pennsylvania Bank. The same reasons which persuaded the Valley
Trust Company court to apply the Act to blanket mortgages might
well persuade a court to continue to apply it to cases of mixed
collateral. This result is unfortunate. If anything, it is more im-
portant in the case of a foreclosure on a business that a lender be
able to resell quickly and in one piece than it is in a foreclosure on
a blanket mortgage. Thus, there is an even greater rationale for
not applying the Act to cases of mixed collateral than there is to
cases of blanket mortgages. However, until Pennsylvania law in
this area is changed, it is advisable for lenders to follow the sug-
gested strategy of proceeding first against personal property and
then foreclosing on real estate.
III. CONCLUSION
A. Flaws in the Act
It is this author's position that there is a fundamental ineq-
uity in a system which has the following flaws:
(1) A lender who takes back collateral because no one else
bid on it at the public foreclosure sale must give the borrower
credit toward satisfaction of the debt in the amount a court says
58. 504 Pa. at 189-90, 470 A.2d at 943-44. For a discussion of the reason-
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should have been bid for the property. The lender is stuck with
the court's valuation regardless of what the property actually
brings at a later sale.
59
(2) In order to take over more than one property under a
blanket mortgage, or to proceed against other property of the
borrower, the lender must run the gauntlet of Deficiency Judg-
ment Act procedures, a process that could take years to
complete.' o
(3) Deficiency judgments are required where the lender's
first step is foreclosure on real estate collateral, but not when he
proceeds first against other types of collateral. The viability of
debtors' protection should not depend upon the order of the pro-
cedural steps taken by a lender.
(4) Similarly, the order in which the lender proceeds against
real estate or other collateral in a case of mixed collateral deter-
mines whether or not the Act is applicable. If the lender first pro-
ceeds against non-real estate collateral, under the provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, there is no deficiency judgment
problem.'!
(5) If the lender holds more than one mortgage on a single
parcel, his election to foreclose on one mortgage or the other de-
termines the amount of the deficiency owed by the borrower after
foreclosure. In either case, there may be no bidding at the sale
and the lender would wind up in possession of the same property,
but the unsatisfied portion of the total debt could vary
drastically.
-2
(6) In the case of blanket mortgages, applicability of the Act
depends on whether the debtor's property is located in one
county or more than one.63 It is difficult to see how this result
furthers the Act's goal of protecting debtors from lenders who try
to take over more properties than necessary to satisfy a debt.
59. For a discussion of the inequities of binding the lender to the court-
fixed valuation of the property, see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
60. For a discussion of the steps involved in proceeding under Penn-
sylvania's Act, see supra notes 7-26 and accompanying text.
61. For a discussion of the variations in result which can occur when the
lender proceeds first under the Uniform Commercial Code, see supra notes 56-
57 and accompanying text.
62. For an illustration of the difference between foreclosing on the second
instead of the first mortgage on a property, see supra notes 29-32 and accompa-
nying text.
63. For a discussion of the applicability of the Act in a blanket mortgage
situation, see supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
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B. Practical Tips for Practicing Lawyers
For the reasons stated above, this author recommends legis-
lative changes to Pennsylvania's Deficiency Judgment Act. Until
such changes, discussed below, are made, lawyers can utilize the
following practical suggestions to avoid application of the Act.
(1) In cases where a loan is secured by both real and per-
sonal property, it is advisable to proceed against the personal
property first. The foreclosure sale of the real estate should take
place after the sale of the personal property so that the lender
does not have to face the deficiency judgment procedure.
(2) In situations where the lender holds two mortgages on
the same parcel, the lender should foreclose on the junior mort-
gage rather than the senior.
(3) The lender should avoid blanket mortgages. When a
loan is secured by properties located in different counties, the
lender should take separate mortgages on each property. In First
Pennsylvania Bank, the court stated that a lender with separate
mortgages on each property does not have to proceed under the
Deficiency Judgment Act. 64 Since the viability of this has been
called into question by the Valley Trust Company case, 65 an addi-
tional strategy is suggested. The lender should consider separate
loans and separate notes as well as separate mortgages. Cross-
collateralization of the separate mortgages, with all mortgages re-
corded as junior liens on each property is also suggested. In ad-
dition, each mortgage should contain a cross-default provision.
Although this may prove too cumbersome in some cases, less
complex versions of this strategy may be employed.
(4) Case law in Pennsylvania requires that a personal judg-
ment be obtained against the borrower before the lender can pe-
tition the court to assign a fair market value to the property.
Foreclosure does not result in a personal judgment. Therefore, if
the lender anticipates that he will proceed against property other
than the mortgaged property, he should institute an action in as-
sumpsit or confession of judgment on the note as early as possi-
ble. The personal judgment must be obtained and the petition to
fix a value for the property acquired at foreclosure must be filed
within six months of the foreclosure proceeding or the lender
loses his rights under the Act. Thus, the lender should institute
64. 504 Pa. at 190, 470 A.2d at 944. For a further discussion of the First
lennsyhania Bank case, see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
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his action to obtain a personal judgment early in order to be cer-
tain of his rights to proceed against other property of the debtor.
(5) Borrowers who want to make sure they get adequate
credit for property to be sold at a sheriff's sale should have a rep-
resentative bid at the sale. At best, the representative can bid up
the selling price to the level of the property's fair market value
and thereby ensure the borrower full credit toward the debt. At
worst, the representative may be the highest bidder. But the rep-
resentative's risk of having to purchase the property is minimal
because a successful bidder at a sheriff's sale who withdraws his
bid usually suffers no adverse consequences. 66 The sheriff will
usually complete the sale with the next highest bidder.
C. Legislative Proposals
In light of current case law and lending practices, it is time
for Pennsylvania's legislature to reconsider the Deficiency Judg-
ment Act. An analysis of the cases and current customs leads to
several suggested changes. First, applicability of the Act should
be strictly limited to residential mortgage foreclosures, in order
to balance more fairly the competing interests of commercial bor-
rowers and lenders. Since borrowers in business transactions
have ample access to attorneys, they can protect themselves
against the evils the Act was intended to prevent. Requiring lend-
ers in commercial transactions to run through the Act's proce-
dural gauntlet when there are other protections available to
borrowers is patently inequitable.
Second, even in residential foreclosures, there seems to be
no reason to require a personal judgment against a debtor before
the lender can take over all of the collateral securing a loan. The
lender who purchases the first property upon foreclosure should
be able to proceed against other portions of the collateral even in
an in rem action. Rather than requiring a deficiency judgment
before proceeding, the law could simply require a fair value pro-
cedure. The borrower would receive a credit for the fair market
value of the property deeded to the lender, and the lender would
be able to proceed only against the remaining collateral for the
balance of the debt.
Third, legislation should be passed that would enable lenders
to sell both the real estate and related personal property in one
sheriff's sale. The present system, which separates real estate
66. For a discussion of the procedural aspects of the Act and the bidding at
the sheriff's sale, see supra notes 7-26 and accompanying text.
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sales from sales of personal property, does not encourage the
highest price, and can create a deficiency judgment problem for
the lender. Defaulting borrowers, as well as lenders, would bene-
fit from a system that enabled a going business or a fully
equipped property to be sold intact.
Last, if the Act is to remain applicable to business loans, at
least the Act should not be applicable to business loans secured
by more than one parcel of real estate or by mixed collateral. As
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in First Pennsylvania Bank,
the lender "who is required to petition the court for a deficiency
judgment in connection with every individual foreclosure action"
on each mortgaged property "will perceive that the value of its
collateral has been significantly reduced." 67 As the court went on
to state, "[l]ending institutions' reluctance to extend financing
under these circumstances would be likely to significantly reduce
the credit available to enterprises with real estate in several coun-
ties."'" 8 Since the lender has bargained for and the borrower has
agreed to specific liens on all the collateral, the lender should be
able to take over his collateral without running the gauntlet of the
Deficiency Judgment Act.
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